[The] maintenance of this monopoly [of the colonial trade] has hitherto been the principal, or more properly perhaps the sole end and purpose of the dominion which Great Britain assumes over her colonies... Under the present system of management, therefore, Great Britain derives nothing but loss from [this] dominion (Adam Smith Wealth of Nations IV.vii.c.64-65:614-15), "As defence, however, is of much more importance than opulence, the act of navigation is, perhaps, the wisest of all the commercial regulations of England" (Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations IV.ii. 29-30:464-65).
Introduction
Adam Smith proposed two contradictory theories of the British Empire in the Wealth of Nations and hinted at a third. In his first view -and the approach on which he places the most emphasis -Smith argued that the empire was based on rent-seeking by merchants eager to establish and maintain monopolies on the colonial trade. As Smith suggests in the first head note, the "maintenance of this monopoly [of the colonial trade] has hitherto been the ... sole end and purpose of the dominion which Great Britain assumes over her colonies" . In this view, Great Britain would be much better off abandoning the American colonies than paying for the colonies' defense. Most scholars follow Smith's emphasis (Ekelund and Tollison 1981 , 1997 , Evensky 2015 , ch 4, Koebner 1961 :219-235, Stevens 1985 :211, Winch 1996 , Van de Haar 2013 .
In the second view, Smith celebrates the European discovery of the new world, opening up non-incremental increases in division of labor, specialization and exchange, and hence the economic growth of both sides of the British Atlantic.
2 In Smith's words, "the discovery of America, and that of a passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope, are the two greatest and most important events recorded in the history of mankind... By uniting, in some measure, the most distant parts of the world, by enabling them to relieve one another's wants, to increase one another's enjoyments, and to encourage one another's industry, their general tendency would seem to be beneficial" (WN IV.vii.c.80:626) . In this view, Britain is far richer and more industrialized because of the larger market and greater division of labor afforded by the colonies (Winch 1965:9-11) . As the division of labor is the hallmark of Smith's theory of economic growth, this second view cannot simply be ignored or pushed aside.
Smith makes a third argument concerning the military value of the empire to the metropole. In this approach, Smith argues that many mercantile restrictions improved Britain's security given a dangerous world. As the head note suggests, Hont (2005 Hont ( ,2015 argues that, in an international context of "the military and political survival of nations ...
[bent] the logic of trade ... to the logic of war." Part of the reason this view is by far the least well-known of Smith's arguments is that Smith did not emphasize it, and his attention to it is scattered in the Wealth of Nations rather than being developed all at once.
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How do we reconcile the incompatibility of Smith's two well-known and one lesserknown views of the British Empire? And how do we make sense of British behavior, both in its mercantile policy and its sustained military rivalry with France? Was the British empire simply the product of interest group behavior biasing policy solely to further the private interests of merchants at public expense, as Smith sometimes suggests (and Ekelund and Tollison 1981 elaborate)?
I argue in this paper that, to understand the British Empire, we must work backwards through the three views. Economists tend to ignore the problem of war and how it affects 3 Cites to Smith. This view has a range of adherents in the Smith literature, including Hont (2005) , Samuels (1973) , and Viner (1948) ; see also Hirschman (1945) . The inattention to war is less of a problem in eras of international peace and global trade.
But it fails in fundamental ways as a means to understand behavior and policymaking in an era of sustained military rivalry. The British Empire arose and prospered in just such an era; namely, Britain's sustained military rivalry with France from 1689 until 1815 (Findlay and O'Rourke 2007:247) . International relations theorists demonstrate that a world of sustained rivalry is much more like a zero-sum game than is a world of international peace and free trade. 5 In particular, Powell (1991) shows that countries engaged in sustained military rivalries will maximize their relative gains. Because the probability of winning wars is a positive function of resources, policies that are negative sum but which harm country one's rival substantially more than it harms itself can be of great advantage. As I discuss below -and in direct contradiction to Smith's arguments favoring free trade -Smith applauded Britain's navigation policies because these restrictions on trade enhanced Britain's military capacity.
The second view fits well with that of the third. The American colonies greatly expanded 4 Although this chapter is one of thirty-two in Smith's book, it is nearly ten percent of Smith's famous work, pp 556-641 of 947 (excluding appendices). 5 Fearon (1995) and Powell (1991) are the international security theorists on whom I draw; see also Morrow et al (1998) . Ekelund and Tollison (1981:**) , Ferguson (2003:20-21) , and Hont (1988:6) In this paper, I make sense of these arguments by emphasizing the second and third as complementary and sensible arguments based on a sustained military threat. I reject the first view because it ignores the problem of international war.
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses Smith's arguments about the costs of the empire and the influence of merchants in maintaining it. Section 3 turns to Smith's discussion of the benefits of empire. Section 4 discusses Smith's third approach emphasizing the logic of war. Section 5 provides an attempt to reconcile Smith's three views, while section 6 develops the implications of this reconciliation. My conclusions follow. Evensky (2015:146) summarizes the view that Britain's mercantile system did more harm than good. As he concludes, "In the name of national interest mercantilist policies have artificially drawn capital into the distant, slower, and less secure 6 See, e.g., Coats (19750, Evensky (2015,ch 4); Hont (2005 Hont ( , 2015 ,ch 6), Kennedy (2010 ,ch11, Keobner (1961 , Phillipson (2010,ch 1) , Skinner (1996 Skinner ( , 2009 , C. Smith (2009,ch**), Tribe (2006) , Van de Haar (2013), and Winch (1965) . 7 Tollison (1981, 1997) provide one of the most comprehensive analysis of Smith's ideas and especially British practice from this perspective (see also Evensky 2015,ch4) . colonial trade."
Evaluating the Net
In addition to the direct benefits and costs of the empire, Smith evaluates the effects of mercantile regulation, arguing that it is costly, negating the benefits of empire: "Even the regulations by which each nation endeavours to secure to itself the exclusive trade of its own colonies, are frequently more hurtful to the countries in favour of which they are established than to those against which they are established" The maintenance of this monopoly has hitherto been the principal, or more properly perhaps the sole end and purpose of the dominion which Great Britain assumes over her colonies. In the exclusive trade, it is supposed, consists the great advantage of provinces, which have never yet afforded either revenue or military force for the support of the civil government, or the defence of the mother country. The monopoly is the principal badge of their dependency, and it is the sole fruit which has hitherto been gathered from that dependency. Whatever expence Great Britain has hitherto laid out in maintaining this dependency, has really been laid out in order to support this monopoly. vii.b.35:579; IV.vii.b.63:590; IV.vii.c.65; 616; IV.vii.c.14:594; . 9 Smith continues, "The whole expence of this peace establishment was a charge upon the revenue of Great Britain, and was, at the same time, the smallest part of what the dominion of the colonies has cost the mother country. If we would know the amount of the whole, we must add to the annual expence of this peace establishment the interest of the sums which, in consequence of her considering her colonies as provinces subject to her dominion, Great Britain has upon different occasions laid out upon their defence. We must add to it, in particular, the whole expence of the late war, and a great part of that of the war which preceded it" ). Smith repeats this conclusion elsewhere in WN: "The pretended purpose of [monopoly privileges] was to encourage the manufactures, and to increase the commerce of Great Britain. But its real effect has been to raise the rate of Koebner (1961:234 ) labels Smith's characterization of the monopolies as "scathing."
Smith argues that the monopoly on trade with the colonies increases merchants profits;
without the monopoly, colonization and trade would be less attractive, with lower quantities supplied. He also suggests that, because monopolization raises profits in the colonial trade, drawing capital away from other investments in Great Britain.
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Smith proposes the obvious remedy to the wrong-headed mercantile policies: Given this problem, the solution is clear "the natural system of perfect liberty and justice ought gradually to be restored ... The adjustment towards this ideal must be incremental so as not to create these 'greater disorders" (WN IV.vii.c.44:606).
In conclusion, Smith reports that, "A great empire has been established for the sole purpose of raising up a nation of customers who should be obliged to buy from the shops of our different producers, all the goods with which these could supply them" (WN IV.viii.53-54:661).
Based on the arguments presented in this section, it appears that Smith has little positive to say about the empire. As I have observed, the secondary literature seems to concur.
Evaluating the Net Value of the Colonies and Empire To the British: The Benefit Side of the Ledger
In contrast to Smith's seemingly clear assertions quoted in the previous section that Britain gained nothing from the American colonies, in a range of other discussions in the Wealth mercantile profit" (WN IV.vii.c.64:616) . And: "Under the present system of management, therefore, Great Britain derives nothing but loss from the dominion which she assumes over her colonies" (WN IV.vii.c.65; 616) . 10 "But whatever raises in any country the ordinary rate of profit higher than it otherwise would be, necessarily subjects that country both to an absolute and to a relative disadvantage in every branch of trade of which she has not the monopoly" (WN IV.vii.c.2-26:598-99).
of Nations, Smith provides equally clear assertions that the net benefits provided by the colonies were "not only advantageous, but greatly advantageous" (WN IV.iii.c.50:608-09; see also IV.vii.c.47:607-08). Smith discusses indirect but substantial sources of advantage to the metropole. These benefits arise from the great expansion of what he famously labeled "the extent of the market" and the subsequent increase in "the division of labor," specialization, and exchange. In direct contradiction to his assertions quoted in section 2, Smith claims more than once that these benefits of empire exceed the costs of monopolies. The natural good effects of the colony trade, however, more than counter-balance to Great Britain the bad effects of the monopoly, so that, monopoly and all together, that trade, even as it is carried on at present, is not only advantageous, but greatly advantageous. The new market and the new employment which are opened by the colony trade, are of much greater extent than that portion of the old market and of the old employment which is lost by the monopoly... If the colony trade, however, even as it is carried on at present is advantageous to Great Britain, it is not by means of the monopoly, but in spite of the monopoly (WN IV.iii.c.50:608-09).
Indirect Economic Benefits to Great Britain from the Colonies
Smith is more specific with respect to empire's effect on British (and European) commerce and manufacturing. He argues that the towns of Europe, as a consequence of the American colonies, serve a very large part of the world, whereas without the colonies, the towns were likely to be much smaller, serving a small, nearby territory and hence be smaller and poorer:
the commercial towns of Europe, instead of being the manufacturers and carriers for but a very small part of the world (that part of Europe which is washed by the Atlantic ocean, and the countries which lie round the Baltick and Mediterranean seas), have now become the manufacturers for the numerous and thriving cultivators of America, and the carriers, and in some respects the manufacturers too, for almost all the different nations of Asia, Africa, and America. Two new worlds have been opened to their industry, each of them much greater and more extensive than the old one, and the market of one of them growing still greater and greater every day. The countries which possess the colonies of America, and which trade directly to the East Indies, enjoy, indeed, the whole shew and splendor of this great commerce ).
Smith further argues that the growth of commerce and manufacturing indirectly improves European agriculture by increasing the demand for these products. "It is chiefly by encouraging the manufactures of Europe, that the colony trade indirectly encourages its agriculture. The manufacturers of Europe, to whom that trade gives employment, constitute a new market for the produce of the land; and the most advantageous of all markets; the home market for the corn and cattle, for the bread and butchers-meat of Europe; is thus greatly extended by means of the trade to America" (WN IV.iii.c.51ea, 609).
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Smith explained that the benefits of the larger market for the goods and produce did not flow on a one way street benefitting solely Great Britain. The Atlantic trade also benefitted the development of the American colonies. The foundation of American economic growth is British institutions, liberty in particular: "In every thing, except their foreign trade, the liberty of the English colonists to manage their own affairs their own way is complete" (WN IV.vii.b.51:584) . "Plenty of good land, and liberty to manage their own affairs their own way, seem to be the two great causes of the prosperity of all new colonies" (WN IV.vii.b.16:572) . The relative scarcity of labor in America implies high wages. These wages, in turn, "encourage population. The cheapness and plenty of good land encourage improvement, and enable the proprietor to pay those high wages. In those wages consists almost the whole price of the land; and though they are high, considered 11 Further, Smith's argues, "Other countries, however, notwithstanding all the invidious restraints by which it is meant to exclude them, frequently enjoy a greater share of the real benefit of it. The colonies of Spain and Portugal, for example, give more real encouragement to the industry of other countries than to that of Spain and Portugal" (WN IV.vii.c.82:627). as the wages of labour, they are low, considered as the price of what is so very valuable.
What encourages the progress of population and improvement, encourages that of real wealth and greatness" (WN IV.vii.b.3:566) . America has not only prospered, but grown faster than Great Britain, as was recognized by many of Smith's contemporaries (cites: e.g., Pownall 1776?).
The faster economic growth in America led Smith famously to predict that the wealth of America would likely surpass that of Britain: "Such has hitherto been the rapid progress of that country in wealth, population and improvement, that in the course of little more than a century, perhaps, the produce of American might exceed that of British taxation" (WN IV.vii.c.79:625).
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In short, Smith's discussion of the gains from exchange emphasizes that the empire was a positive-sum game for both sides of the Atlantic. Further, as Fay suggests in the third head-note, Smith walks the "razor's edge" between the first two views. Smith articulates the general principle underlying many specific instances, arguing that defense trumps opulence in trade policy (Hont 2005; Samuels 1973 ). Trade regulations that improve security may be beneficial to Great Britain even if they reduce wealth. In Smith's words:
Smith's Third View: The Military Benefits of Colonies
If any particular manufacture was necessary, indeed, for the defence of the society, it might not always be prudent to depend upon our neighbours for the supply; and if such manufacture could not otherways be supported at home, it might not be unreasonable that all the other branches of industry should be taxed in order to support it. The bounties upon the exportation of British-made sail-cloth, and British-made gun-powder, may, perhaps, both be vindicated upon this principle (WN IV.v.a.36:522-23; see also IV.ii.23-24:563).
This approach has important adherents in the literature. National security with respect to material of strategic value requires independence of foreign rivals who could withhold them.
13 Viner (1948:282) elaborates: "In the seventeenth and eighteenth 13 "[A]bout the beginning of the present century, in 1703, the pitch and tar company of Sweden endeavoured to raise the price of their commodities to Great Britain, by prohibiting their exportation, except in their own ships, at their own price, and in such quantities as they thought proper. In order to counteract this notable piece of mercantile policy, and to render herself as much as possible independent, not only of Sweden, but of all the other northern powers, Great Britain gave a bounty upon the importation of naval stores from America, and the effect of this bounty was to raise the price of timber in America, much more than the confinement to the home market could centuries, colonial and other overseas markets, the fisheries, the carrying trade, the slave
trade, and open trade routes over the high seas, were all regarded, and rightly, as important sources of national wealth, but were available, or at least assuredly available, only to countries with the ability to acquire or retain them by means of the possession and readiness to use military strength." Power is a function of the ability to mobilize resources useful in war. Students of international relations define it as the probability a country will triumph over a military rivalry (see Fearon 1995 , Hirschman 1945 , and Powell 1991 .
Power relative to other countries in early modern Europe depended in large part on the military and financial capacities. Given the danger of war, national welfare depended not only on the division of labor and the size of the market, but a nation's power relative to potential enemies. Hont (2005:15) explains how, under these circumstances, trade policy necessary became an instrument of security. States had no choice; the "aggressive acquisition of wealth was a mode of national self-preservation."
Indeed it became an arms race. If one country failed to develop sufficient military and financial resources, others would gain an edge. Hont (2005:15) states the obvious. In the context of a sustained military rivalry, "national self-preservation depended on military strength."
Using this logic, many of Britain's trade restrictions become more comprehensible. Smith observes that there seems to be cases in which "it will generally lower it; and as both regulations were enacted at the same time, their joint effect was rather to encourage than to discourage the clearing of land in America" (WN IV.vii.b.36:580).
be advantageous to lay some burden upon foreign, for the encouragement of domestick industry" (WN IV.ii.23-24:463). Consider a setting in which:
some particular sort of industry is necessary for the defence of the country. The defence of Great Britain, for example, depends very much upon the number of its sailors and shipping. The act of navigation, therefore, very properly endeavours to give the sailors and shipping of Great Britain the monopoly of the trade of their own country, in some cases, by absolute prohibitions, and in others by heavy burdens upon the shipping of foreign countries (WN IV.ii.23-24:463). Turning to the comprehensive regulatory statutes governing trade in the empire, Smith explains that, because they contribute to British security, the acts of navigation are value to Britain. Speaking of Restoration England (1660-89), Smith declares that the navigation acts, "are as wise ... as if they had all been dictated by the most deliberate wisdom. National animosity at that particular time aimed at the very same object which the most deliberate wisdom would have recommended, the diminution of the naval power of Holland, the only naval power which could endanger the security of England" (WN IV.ii.29:464). Magnusson (2007:56) reports that Thomas Mun, a mid-17th century mercantilist, argued that England was a "more or less constantly" at war with the Dutch, in which the Dutch naval superiority was able to drive away the British from valuable trading opportunities.
Smith continues this characterization of the navigation acts at length:
The act of navigation is not favourable to foreign commerce, or to the growth of that opulence which can arise from it. The interest of a nation in its commercial relations to foreign nations is, like that of a merchant with regard to the different people with whom he deals, to buy as cheap and to sell as dear as possible. But it will be most likely to buy cheap, when by the most perfect freedom of trade it encourages all nations to bring to it the goods which it has occasion to purchase; and, for the same reason, it will be most likely to sell dear, when its markets are thus filled with the greatest number of buyers. The act of navigation, it is true, lays no burden upon foreign ships that come to export the produce of British industry. Even the antient aliens duty, which used to be paid upon all goods exported as well as imported, has, by several subsequent acts, been taken off from the greater part of the articles of exportation. But if foreigners, either by prohibitions or high duties, are hindered from coming to sell, they cannot always afford to come to buy; because coming without a cargo, they must lose the freight from their own country to Great Britain. By diminishing the number of sellers, therefore, we necessarily diminish that of buyers, and are thus likely not only to buy foreign goods dearer, but to sell our own cheaper, than if there was a more perfect freedom of trade. As defence, however, is of much more importance than opulence, the act of navigation is, perhaps, the wisest of all the commercial regulations of England (WN IV.ii.29-30:464-65).
14 One way to understand the logic of Smith's third view is to make explicit a counterfactual implicit in Smith's first argument and hence duplicated in the literature.
14 The editors read this passage in the same way. In a previous passage with similar logic, they say with reference to this passage: "See below, IV.ii.24,30. In the latter reference, the Navigation Acts are defended on the ground that defence is of more importance than opulence" (n26, WN II.v.30:371). implied that in modern politics the logic of trade was bent to the logic of war" (Hont 2005:6 ) . To understand much of 18th century writing on trade, Smith included, we must understand it against the background of sustained commercial war.
Between 1689 and 1815, Britain and France were at war in more years than not;
and in many of the years of peace, they were preparing for war (Hont 2005:24) . The long-term military rivalry of Britain and France contradicts Smith's counterfactual of global peace and free trade. Because Smith's counterfactual ignores the problem of a sustained military conflict, it is an inadequate standard from which to evaluate British policy given the on-going conflict with France. Smith acknowledges the 16 For example, "Though the encouragement of exportation, and the discouragement of importation are the two great engines by which the mercantile system proposes to enrich every country, yet with regard to some particular commodities, it seems to follow an opposite plan: to discourage exportation and to encourage importation. Its ultimate object, however, it pretends, is always the same, to enrich the country by an advantageous balance of trade. It discourages the exportation of the materials of manufacture, and of the instruments of trade, in order to give our own workmen an advantage, and to enable them to undersell those of other nations in all foreign markets: and by restraining, in this manner, the exportation of a few commodities, of no great price, it proposes to occasion a much greater and more valuable exportation of others (WN IV.viii.6-7:644).
military conflict in his third view. This logic of the on-going conflict with France therefore favors the third argument.
Modern International Relations Theory
I draw on the work of modern international relations theory to help adjudicate among Smith's incompatible views of empire. This theory provides important insights into the optimal strategies countries should pursue during sustained military rivalries.
I begin with Fearon's (1995) seminal answer as to why we observe war despite it being costly. Shouldn't both parties to war be better off negotiating instead of fighting?
Fearon explains that bargaining problems often prevent such agreements to avoid war.
For example, asymmetric information problems often lead to different beliefs about relative capabilities of two potential military combatants. If party one believes it is much stronger than party two believes it is, then the largest bargain party one may offer party two can be lower than the lowest bargain party two would accept. In this setting, the two parties cannot agree to a bargain that prevents war. Asymmetric information problems can lead to an international environment where security is an omnipresent problem, as between Britain and France in the 18 th century. But if security and war are constant problems, and if the two countries are military rivals, then the exchange makes first country worse off. Because the exchange increases the power of country two relative to country one, the exchange raises the expected amount that country two can extract from country one in war (Powell 1991; see also Fearon 1995 and Hirschman 1945) . This exchange enhances the relative military capacity of country two and is therefore a bad deal for country one. Hont (2005:23-24) Maryland and Virginia in illustration. In his discussion of Smith, Winch (1965:10-11 ) discusses relative gains. A related problem with trade with the enemy is that it can make a country vulnerable to holdup problems in the event of
Instead of engaging in trade with each other, each country in a military rivalry has strong security incentives to separate its economy from its enemy's. The value of an empire in this setting is to expand the country's economy, increasing the extent of the market and hence the division of labor and economic growth. Given a military rivalry, it may be optimal to build an empire that approximates free trade within -subject to war (Hirschman 1945 :**); and can provide the enemy with valuable military resources that it might not be able to obtain otherwise. In this environment of sustained military rivalry, combatants are led to structure an empire differently from that in a world of global free trade without war. 19 Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares (1998) provide the best discussion of this topic, covering both the international relations literature and the economics literature on international trade.
To summarize the theory of empire in an international security environment of sustained military rivalry, countries have incentives to create trade barriers between empires. These trade barriers served several purposes:
1.
(i) to deny the opponents valuable military inputs, a form of "raising rivals costs" (Salop and Scheffman 1983; Hirschman 1945 );
2.
(ii) to limit the size of the opponent's market and thus restrict opportunities for the opponents economic growth through the division of labor, and specialization and exchange (Powell 1991; Hirschman 1945);  3.
(iii) to limit the empire's dependence on material that an opponent might deny them during war.
The value of colonies to the metropole can be quite high if the colonies substantially increase the division of labor and if they provide a cheaper and abundant source of scare military supplies.
The Implications of a Sustained Military Rivalry for Evaluating the Net Value of the Colonies
In the presence of a sustained security threat from France, the colonies proved a valuable resource to Britain in several ways. They expanded the size of the market, (Fearon 1995 , Morrow et al 1998 , North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009 , and Powell 1992 . And yet violence was a reality (Hont 2005 and Viner 1948) . Further this violence required that mitigating violence be an active margin of public decisionmaking. Analysts who ignore violence therefore systematically miss an important and rational motivation for decisionmaking. By ignoring violence, these analysts can neither explain why states make their policies -here colonial policy and mercantilism -nor can they appropriately evaluate the normative value of policies to mitigate violence, which appear to economists as mere market intervention.
Conclusions
Smith Missing the problem of violence leads economists -both Smith and modern ones -to misinterpret British navigation regulations.
Drawing on international relations theory, I discuss how the optimal trade policies with respect to empires in a world with considerable security threats differ from those in a world of global free trade. These policies, often reflected in theories of mercantilism, appear to economists who ignore violence as costly market intervention that should be removed. In terms of this paper's emphasis on sustained military rivalries, removing these restrictions unilaterally would not make Britain better off because it would have Britain more vulnerable to France.
In a world of violence and security threats, the American colonies contributed in numerous ways to the larger wealth and security of Great Britain: they enlarged the "extent of the British market" and hence division of labor; they raised the returns on British investment; and they kept strategic materials away from military rivals. More importantly, the British empire had two direct effects with respect to France: it prevented
France from participating in the gains from major portions of the American trade, thus restricting the "extent of the French market" and its division of labor; and it prevented an Because the security threat to the empire had dramatically fallen, the value of global free trade had risen. Appositely, Magnusson (2007:46) 
